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ABSTRACT 
Saving money should not be expensive. Compensation “clawbacks” are a legal 
mechanism for companies to reclaim employee compensation, but the legislative 
framework is complex and disorganized. There are four primary federal clawback 
provisions: Sarbanes-Oxley § 304, Dodd-Frank § 954, 12 U.S.C.A. § 5221 
(TARP), and Dodd-Frank § 956—as well as voluntary contractual clawback pol-
icies. This comment untangles the web of clawback legislation by overlaying each 
clawback mechanism to extract a single, clear, and concise description of execu-
tive compensation clawbacks, called the “Comprehensive Clawback Coverage.” 
The Comprehensive Clawback Coverage reveals a major flaw in the legal and 
regulatory framework: clawbacks increase agency costs. In other words, they are 
expensive. The logical solution involves legislative repeal, legislative amendment, 
or regulatory policy shift with respect to executive compensation clawback pro-
visions. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In late 2016, the American public was outraged when Wells Fargo CEO John 
Stumpf testified before the Senate Banking Committee that his employees stole 
from roughly two million of their customers.1 Compensation “clawbacks” have 
been used to recover $69,000,000 from Stumpf.2 Although many were satisfied 
by Stumpf’s fate, the Wells Fargo scandal highlights a larger debate in American 
jurisprudence over whether clawbacks are a sound corporate governance tool.3 
Compensation clawbacks are a legal mechanism for companies to reclaim 
employee compensation,4 but the legislative framework is complex and disor-
ganized. There are four primary federal clawback provisions: Sarbanes-Oxley § 
304, Dodd-Frank § 954, 12 U.S.C.A. § 5221 (TARP), and Dodd-Frank § 956, as 
well as relevant proposed legislation. In addition, companies often utilize contrac-
tual clawback policies with coverage extending beyond statutory requirements.5 
Furthermore, each clawback mechanism has distinct targets, triggers, penalties, 
                                                     
1 See Sean Duffy (@RepSeanDuffy), Duffy Questions Wells Fargo CEO, YOUTUBE (Sept. 30, 
2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=inagswcdxgI. 
2 See infra notes 202, 209. 
3 Andrew Ross Sorkin, ‘Clawbacks’ Could Backfire, N.Y. TIMES (July 13, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/14/business/dealbook/clawbacks-could-backfire.html?_r=0. 
4 What Is A Clawback Provision?, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, http://thelawdictionary.org/arti-
cle/what-is-a-clawback-provision/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2017). 
5 See, e.g., Wells Fargo & Co., Notice of Annual Meeting of Stockholders 47–50 (Mar. 16, 2016), 
https://www08.wellsfargomedia.com/assets/pdf/about/investor-relations/annual-reports/2016-proxy-
statement.pdf. 
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enforcement bodies, and purposes. This paper untangles the complex web of claw-
back legislation by examining each factor with respect to each clawback mecha-
nism, then overlays the clawback mechanisms to extract a single, clear, and con-
cise description of executive compensation clawbacks called the “Comprehensive 
Clawback Coverage.”  
The Comprehensive Clawback Coverage reveals a major flaw in the current 
legal frame work: clawbacks increase agency costs.6 To facilitate a better under-
standing of the practical effects of clawbacks, this comment includes two case 
studies, including the Wells Fargo scandal involving John Stumpf, as well as an 
original empirical study by the author. The analysis leads to only one logical so-
lution to the agency cost problem that strains companies, shareholders, and the 
American financial system: repeal or amend the statutory clawback provisions. 
II.  STATUTORY CLAWBACK MECHANISMS 
Under federal law, there are four statutory clawback mechanisms: Sarbanes-
Oxley § 304, Dodd-Frank § 954, 12 U.S.C. § 5221 (TARP), and the proposed 
regulations pursuant to Dodd-Frank § 956. This section distinguishes and dis-
cusses the target, trigger, penalty, enforcement, and purpose of each statutory 
clawback. 
A.  Sarbanes-Oxley Section 304 
Sarbanes-Oxley § 304 targets the compensation of the chief executive officer 
and chief financial officer of an issuer that files accounting statements with the 
SEC.7 In June 2016, JPMorgan estimated that there were 4,333 publicly-listed 
companies to which Section 304 would apply.8  
Clawbacks under § 304 are triggered “[i]f an issuer is required to prepare an 
accounting restatement due to the material noncompliance of the issuer, as a result 
of misconduct, with any financial reporting requirement under the securities 
laws.”9 Sarbanes-Oxley § 302 outlines the financial reporting requirements, which 
require “the principal executive officer or officers and the principal financial of-
ficer or officers . . . [to] certify in each annual or quarterly report . . . [and] the 
signing officers—(A) [to be held] responsible for establishing and maintaining 
internal controls.”10 
                                                     
6 In the context of executive compensation, “agency costs” are costs incurred by companies as a 
result of conflicts of interest between companies and their executives. See infra note 196. 
7 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 304, 116 Stat. 745 [hereinafter Sarbanes-
Oxley] (codified in 15 U.S.C.A. § 7243 (2002)). 
8 Rayhanul Ibrahim, The Number of Publicly-Traded US Companies is Down 46% in the Past 
Two Decades, YAHOO: FINANCE (Aug. 8, 2016), http://finance.yahoo.com/news/jp-startup-public-
companies-fewer-000000709.html. 
9 Sarbanes-Oxley, supra note 7, at § 304(a).  
10 Id. at § 302. 
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While § 304 does not define “misconduct,” the standard of liability is whether 
the CEO or the CFO “believed, knew, or should have known that the information 
was material and incorrect.”11 Case law has determined that personal misconduct 
by the CEO or the CFO is not required; misconduct by anyone in the company 
can trigger a clawback.12 For example in SEC v. Jenkins, an Arizona district court 
denied the defendant CEO’s motion to dismiss even though the complaint did not 
allege wrongdoing by the CEO.13 In SEC v. Jensen, the Ninth Circuit also held 
that “the disgorgement remedy authorized under [Sarbanes-Oxley §] 304 applies 
regardless of whether a restatement was caused by the personal misconduct of an 
issuer's CEO and CFO or by other issuer misconduct.”14  
 
The penalty under § 304 is mandatory15 reimbursement of any 
bonus or other incentive-based or equity-based compensation 
received . . . from the issuer during the 12–month period fol-
lowing the first public issuance or filing with the Commission 
(whichever first occurs) of the financial document embodying 
such financial reporting requirement; and (2) any profits real-
ized from the sale of securities of the issuer during that 12–
month period.16 
 
Only the SEC has the authority to enforce § 304 clawbacks;17 § 304 does not 
expressly create a private right of action.18 In In Re Digimarc Corporation Litiga-
tion, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that § 304 does not create an implied private right 
of action either, because other Sarbanes-Oxley provisions, “expressly create[] a 
private right of action to enforce” and the absence of an express private right of 
action must have been intentional.19 Other federal circuits concur with this inter-
pretation.20 
By implication, companies are also prohibited from indemnifying CEOs and 
CFOs subject to § 304 clawbacks.21 In Cohen v. Viray, the Second Circuit held 
                                                     
11 SEC Requires CEO and CFO Certification of Quarterly and Annual Reports, MORRISON 
FOERSTER (Sept. 4, 2002), https://www.mofo.com/resources/publications/sec-requires-ceo-and-cfo-
certification-of-quarterly-and-annual-reports.html. 
12 SEC v. Jenkins, 718 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1074 (D. Ariz. 2010). 
13 See generally Jenkins, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 1070. 
14 SEC v. Jensen, 835 F.3d 1100, 1104 (9th Cir. 2016). 
15 Section 304 “imposes a mandatory duty on those subject to it . . . CEO and CFO ‘shall reim-
burse’ . . . [and] it vests the SEC with the authority to exempt any person from the obligation.” Cohen 
v. Viray, 622 F.3d 188, 195 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 7243(a)). 
16 Sarbanes-Oxley, supra note 7, at § 304. 
17 Cohen, 622 F.3d at 195 (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u(d)(1)). 
18 Diaz v. Davis (In Re Digimarc Corp. Derivative Litig.), 549 F.3d 1223, 1233 (9th Cir. 2008). 
19 Id. at 1232. 
20 See, e.g., Cohen 622 F.3d at 195; Pirelli Armstrong Tire Corp. Retiree Med. Benefits Tr. v. 
Raines, 534 F.3d 779, 793 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
21 See generally Cohen, 622 F.3d at 195. 
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that, “indemnification and release provisions of the Settlement violate § 304.”22 
The court reasoned that “Congress . . . provided only the SEC authority to exempt 
persons from § 304(a), indicating that only the SEC has that authority and that 
other parties do not.”23 The court also reasoned that indemnification must be pro-
hibited, because § 304 would otherwise have no deterrent effect if CEOs and 
CFOs could defer liability to the company.24 On the other hand, the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s reasoning is not entirely correct, because executives still “suffer a penalty” 
when bargaining for indemnification protections upon hiring,25 often accepting a 
lower salary in return.26 More accurately, indemnification would allow executives 
to accelerate the timing of paying for wrongdoings. 
The strongest criticism of § 304 is that if the SEC does not enforce clawbacks, 
§ 304 is powerless. In practice, SEC enforcement has been rare; the first § 304 
clawback did not occur until more than five years after Sarbanes-Oxley was 
adopted.27 By 2008, the SEC had only brought two § 304 actions despite thou-
sands of accounting restatements.28 By 2012, the SEC clawed back compensation 
from just ten CEOs or CFOs.29 One study calculated that by the end of 2016, only 
twenty-five CEOs or CFOs had ever been subject to § 304 compensation “recov-
eries,” which does not distinguish between clawbacks and voluntary reimburse-
ment.30 Of those twenty-five recoveries, nine did not involve executive miscon-
duct.31 
Section 304’s purposes are 1) to primarily “ensure that a company’s CEO and 
CFO take a proactive role in their company’s public disclosure,”32 2) equitable, 
and 3) incidentally punitive.  
                                                     
22 Id. at 192. 
23 Id. at 194. 
24 Id. at 195. 
25 Cf. discussion infra Section V. Part B. (discussing “ex ante” indemnification costs for execu-
tives without indemnification protection). 
26 Richard Harroch, Negotiating Employment Agreements: Checklist of 14 Key Issues, FORBES: 
ENTREPRENEURS (Nov. 11, 2013), https://www.forbes.com/sites/allbusiness/2013/11/11/negotiating-
employment-agreements-checklist-of-14-key-issues/#581888e724c6. 
27 “. . . UnitedHealth Groups former CEO William McGuire was forced to return $600 million 
in compensation.” Kevin J. Murphy, Executive Compensation: Where We Are and How We Got There, 
HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF FINANCE 89 (Constantinides, Harris, & Stulz, eds., 2013) (citing 
Phyllis Plitch, Paydirt: Sarbanes-Oxley a Pussycat on ‘Clawbacks,’ DOW JONES NEWSWIRES (2006); 
Bowe & White, Record Payback over Options, FINANCIAL TIMES (2007)). 
28 Sam Sharp, Whose Money Is It Anyway? Why Dodd-Frank Mandatory Compensation Claw-
backs Are Bad Public Policy, 10 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 321, 328 (2012). 
29 Id. 
30 Jesse M. Fried, Rationalizing the Dodd-Frank Clawback app. tbls. 1, 2 (Eur. Corp. Goverance 
Inst., Working Paper No. 314/2016, Sept. 26, 2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab-
stract_id=2764409. 
31 Id. 
32 See SEC Requires CEO and CFO Certification of Quarterly and Annual Reports, supra note 
11. 
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First, § 304 incentivizes managerial oversight of full and accurate financial 
disclosures. In its entirety, Sarbanes-Oxley was “designed to improve the quality 
of and transparency in financial reporting and auditing of public companies”33 in 
the aftermath of numerous accounting scandals.34 Sarbanes-Oxley was therefore 
created to reform disclosure practices, rather than directly reform compensation 
regulations.35 Section 302 requires “the principal executive officer or officers and 
the principal financial officer or officers . . . [to] certify in each annual or quarterly 
report . . . [and] the signing officers—(A) are responsible for establishing and 
maintaining internal controls.”36 Section 304 imposes clawbacks on CEOs and 
CFOs who fail to meet the § 302 accounting disclosure and internal control 
maintenance requirements.37 By requiring CEOs and CFOs to certify accounting 
statements that may lead to personal compensation clawbacks, the CEO and the 
CFO—the individuals in the best position to ensure accurate disclosures—are in-
centivized to provide the most accurate disclosure possible.  
Second, § 304 achieves equitable reimbursement to the company. In SEC v. 
Microtune, the SEC argued that “repayment of profits from stock sales under Sec-
tion 304 . . . restores the status quo ante by returning equity-based compensation 
to [the company].”38 In dicta, the Ninth Circuit supported the same justification, 
explaining that § 304’s “disgorgement remedies are equitable (in the sense that 
they require wrongdoers to reimburse the issuer for ill-gotten gains).”39 The Fed-
eral District of Arizona was less decisive, however, stating that “it is not clear . . 
. that the statute’s purpose must be remedial.”40 Regardless, the effect of a claw-
back—returning money to a company—is certainly equitable. 
Equitable reimbursement can also be viewed from the perspective of prevent-
ing unjust enrichment to executives who do not deserve to keep the profits. Some 
justify § 304 clawbacks because “the CEO may unfairly benefit from a misper-
ception of the financial position of the issuer that results from those misstated 
financials, even if the CEO was unaware of the misconduct leading to misstated 
                                                     
33 Cohen v. Viray, 622 F.3d 188, 195 (2d Cir. 2010). 
34 Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 484 (2010); John Pat-
rick Kelsh, Section 304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: The Case for a Personal Culpability Re-
quirement, 59 BUS. LAW. 1005, 1018 (May 2004) (referring to the Tyco, Adelphia, and Worldcom 
scandals). 
35 See SEC Requires CEO and CFO Certification of Quarterly and Annual Reports, supra note 
11. 
36 Sarbanes-Oxley, supra note 7, at § 302. 
37 Id. at § 304. 
38 SEC v. Microtune, Inc., 783 F. Supp. 2d 867, 885 (N.D. Tex. 2011) (citing Miss. Dep't of 
Econ. & Cmty. Dev. v. United States DOL, 90 F.3d 110, 113 (5th Cir. 1996)). 
39 Diaz v. Davis (In re Digimarc Corp. Derivative Litig.), 549 F.3d 1223, 1233 (9th Cir. 2008). 
40 SEC v. Jenkins, 718 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1076 (D. Ariz. 2010). 
2018                         CLAWBACKS AND THEIR COSTLY FLAW                                          359 
 
financials.”41 Profits earned during the twelve-month period preceding an ac-
counting misstatement would also benefit an executive who did not “perform” for 
that pay.42  
Third, legislative history and case law suggest that § 304 is at most inci-
dentally punitive. The House Bill proposing § 30443 required scienter, limiting 
clawbacks to situations where “the [Securities and Exchange] Commission can 
prove extreme misconduct on the part of [the] officer or director” to disgorge 
profits.44 The final version approved by the Senate eliminated the scienter require-
ment.45 In SEC v. Microtune, the SEC also acknowledged that “repayment of prof-
its from stock sales under Section 304 . . . is not punitive.”46 In 2010, an Arizona 
district court hesitantly stated, “Nor is it yet clear . . . that [Section 304] has puni-
tive aspects.”47 In 2012, however, the Ninth Circuit decisively held that “Ninth 
Circuit law is clear that the reimbursement provision of [Sarbanes-Oxley §] 304 
is considered an equitable disgorgement remedy and not a legal penalty.”48 
Still, § 304 resembles a quasi-criminal punishment. The Second Circuit rea-
soned that it was “Congress’s effort[] to make high ranking corporate officers of 
public companies directly responsible for their actions,” so long as enforcement 
was in the public’s interest.49 An explicit punitive purpose may be problematic 
though, by tying penalties to events unrelated to the clawback trigger.50 For ex-
ample, § 304 requires disgorgement of “any . . . incentive-based or equity-based 
compensation,” but does not distinguish between the stock value that accrued be-
fore and after the trigger; clawbacks can include stock value that accrued before 
the wrongdoing.51 The defendant CEO in SEC v. Jenkins similarly argued that any 
benefit he might have received from the sale of stock was “not, in any way, trace-
able to any misstatement of [the company’s] financial positions.”52 Because de-
termining § 304 had a punitive purpose would have implicated constitutionally-
required findings of culpability,53 the court inferred that Congress did not intend 
                                                     
41 Id. at 1075. 
42 Id. at 1073. 
43 H.R. 3763 §12; Jenkins, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 1077. 
44 H.R. Rep. No. 107-414, at 44 (2002); Jenkins, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 1078. 
45 See S. 2673, 107th Cong. (June 25, 2002); see also H.R. 3763, 107th Cong. (July 15, 2002). 
46 SEC v. Microtune, Inc., 783 F. Supp. 2d 867, 885 (N.D. Tex. 2011) (citing Brief Opinion at 
5–6; citing Miss. Dep't of Econ. & Cmty. Dev. v. United States DOL, 90 F.3d 110, 113 (5th Cir. 
1996)). 
47 Jenkins, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 1076.  
48 SEC v. Jasper, 678 F.3d 1116, 1130 (9th Cir. 2012). 
49 Cohen v. Viray, 622 F.3d 188, 195 (2d Cir. 2010). 
50 Kelsh, supra note 34, at 1030–34. 
51 Sarbanes-Oxley, supra note 7, at § 304. 
52 Jenkins, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 1075. 
53 “As the Supreme Court has repeatedly noted, the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments ‘impose[] substantive limits beyond which penalties may not go’[footnote omit-
ted]. One significant such limit is that on certain impositions of liability in the absence of personal 
culpability.” Kelsh, supra note 34, at 1030–31. 
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to require personal wrongdoing—only wrongdoing by the corporate entity.54 
Therefore, it is not necessary to piecemeal disgorged profits to the extent of the 
executive’s role.55  
On one hand, § 304 can never be entirely unrelated to the CEO or the CFO, 
because the CEO and the CFO are required to sign and endorse accounting state-
ments pursuant to Sarbanes-Oxley § 302.56 In addition, an explicit punitive pur-
pose might deter the types of “accounting debacles57” that Congress intended to 
deter. Like the Dodd-Frank Pay-Ratio provisions,58 which arguably deter exces-
sive compensation packages by shaming executives,59 an explicit punitive pur-
pose in § 304 might shame and deter executives from engaging in conduct that 
triggers clawbacks.  
In conclusion, § 304 is primarily intended to ensure the CEO and the CFO 
provide full and accurate disclosure in accounting statements. Additionally, § 304 
provides an equitable remedy. While § 304 is not explicitly punitive, it somewhat 
resembles the punitive aspect of the House Bill that was never implemented. In 
practice, the SEC can more easily enforce clawbacks without having to prove an 
additional punitive element. Furthermore, facilitating enforcement while avoiding 
Constitutional hurdles is preferable to the deterrent benefits of an explicit punitive 
justification—which seem to permeate into the courts’ § 304 decisions anyway.60 
B.  Dodd-Frank Section 954 
Section 954 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act targets the compensation of “any current or former executive officer of the 
issuer who received incentive-based compensation (including stock options 
awarded as compensation) during the three-year period preceding the date on 
which the issuer is required to prepare an accounting restatement.”61 In 2015, the 
SEC estimated that § 954 was applicable to approximately 4,845 listed compa-
nies.62  
Clawbacks under § 954 are triggered if “the issuer is required to prepare an 
accounting restatement due to the material noncompliance of the issuer with any 
                                                     
54 Jenkins, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 1074–76. 
55 See generally SEC v. Jenkins, 718 F. Supp. 2d 1070 (D. Ariz. 2010). 
56 Sarbanes-Oxley, supra note 7, at § 302. 
57 Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 484 (2010). 
58 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 
1376 § 951 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank]. 
59 Murphy, supra note 27, at 117. 
60 See, e.g., Cohen v. Viray, 622 F.3d 188, 195 (2d Cir. 2010) (“make high ranking corporate 
officers of public companies directly responsible for their actions”). 
61 Dodd-Frank, supra note 58, at § 954(b)(2) (emphasis added). 
62 Listing Standards for Recovery of Erroneously Awarded Compensation, 80 Fed. Reg. 41143, 
41172 (proposed July 14, 2015) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 240, 249, 274), https://www.fed-
eralregister.gov/documents/2015/07/14/2015-16613/listing-standards-for-recovery-of-erroneously-a 
warded-compensation [hereinafter Listing Standards]. 
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financial reporting requirement under the securities laws . . . [that requires] an 
accounting restatement.”63 Furthermore, § 954 has a mandatory clawback trigger, 
because it “require[s] each issuer to develop and implement a policy . . . [whereby] 
the issuer will recover [compensation].”64 
Section 954 lacks a misconduct requirement. As it currently stands, execu-
tives may be required to return excess incentive-based compensation even if they 
had no role in the accounting misstatement.65 This may change in the near future 
however. The Republican House released a “discussion draft” of the Financial 
CHOICE Act of 2017 (dubbed the “CHOICE Act 2.0”66) on April 19, 2017 that 
would amend Dodd-Frank § 954 to apply “where such executive officer had con-
trol or authority over the financial reporting that resulted in the accounting restate-
ment.”67 
 The penalty under § 954 allows the  
 
issuer [to] recover . . . any . . . incentive-based compensation 
(including stock options awarded as compensation) during the 
3–year period preceding the date on which the issuer is required 
to prepare an accounting restatement . . . in excess of what 
would have been paid to the executive officer under the ac-
counting restatement.68  
 
Section 954 is therefore backward-looking, disgorging compensation re-
ceived within the period of three years before an accounting restatement.  
Section 954 is enforced by 1) the SEC, 2) publicly listed companies, and 3) 
national securities exchanges and national securities associations. First, the SEC 
“shall require each issuer to develop and implement a [clawback] policy” in com-
pliance with § 954(b).69 Second, publicly listed companies are required to enforce 
those clawback policies.70 Section 954 creates both a direct cause of action, 
brought by the board of directors, and a derivative cause of action, brought by the 
shareholders. Third, national securities exchanges and national securities associ-
ations are required to de-list companies that do not develop and implement a claw-
back policy in compliance with § 954(b).71 
                                                     
63 Dodd-Frank, supra note 58, at § 954(b)(2). 
64 Dodd-Frank, supra note 58, at § 954(b). 
65 Listing Standards, supra note 62, at 41176. 
66 John C. Dugan & Randy Benjenk, CHOICE Act 2.0: House Financial Services Committee 
Revises Regulatory Reform Bill, HARVARD L. SCHOOL FORUM ON CORP. GOVERNANCE AND 
FINANCIAL REGULATION (May 8, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/05/08/choice-act-2-0-
house-financial-services-committee-revises-regulatory-reform-bill/. 
67 Financial CHOICE Act of 2017 §849, H.R.__ [Discussion Draft], 115th Cong. (2017), avail-
able at https://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/choice_2.0_discussion_draft.pdf. 
68 Dodd-Frank, supra note 58, at § 954(b)(2). 
69 Dodd-Frank, supra note 58, at § 954(b). 
70 Dodd-Frank, supra note 58, at § 954(b)(2). 
71 Dodd-Frank, supra note 58, at § 954(a). 
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Like Sarbanes-Oxley, the purpose of Dodd-Frank is best understood in his-
torical context. Dodd-Frank was enacted in response to the 2008 financial crisis.72 
In its entirety, Dodd-Frank was enacted to “promote the financial stability of the 
United States by improving accountability and transparency in the financial sys-
tem, to end ‘too big to fail’, to protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts, 
to protect consumers from abusive financial services practices, and for other pur-
poses.”73  
Specifically, § 954 is corrective and equitable, focusing only on unjust en-
richment from compensation not “earned.”74 The SEC explained that, “sharehold-
ers of these listed issuers would benefit from a policy to recover excess incentive-
based compensation and that . . . will further the statutory goal of assuring that 
executive officers do not retain incentive-based compensation that they received 
erroneously.”75 Furthermore, by limiting the clawback to the excess of what 
would have been paid to the executive officer under the accounting restatement, 
§ 954 is not punitive. 
Some commentators criticize the scope of companies to which § 954 ap-
plies.76 By applying to all listed companies, § 954 effectively reformed United 
States corporate law as a whole, rather than targeting only the “too big to fail” 
financial institutions as Dodd-Frank intended. For example, in the SEC’s Pro-
posed Listing Standards, the SEC stated, “we read the language of Section 10D 
[as modified by Dodd-Frank Section 954] as generally calling for a broad appli-
cation of the mandated listing standards.”77 Section 954’s broad application seems 
to fulfill the “Creeping Federalization of Corporate Law” that Stephen Bainbridge 
predicted in 2003 after Sarbanes-Oxley.78 
Furthermore, § 954 may create incentives that are misaligned with Dodd-
Frank’s purpose. For example, Dodd-Frank does not specifically deter the execu-
tives able to “promote the financial stability of the United States.” By broadly 
applying to “any executive” at a target company, Dodd-Frank impacts many ex-
ecutives with no access and control over compliance with accounting standards,79 
even though this ultra-broad scope will eventually include the decision makers. 
                                                     
72 See The Origins of the Financial Crisis: Crash Course, THE ECONOMIST (Sept. 7, 2013), 
http://www.economist.com/news/schoolsbrief/21584534-effects-financial-crisis-are-still-being-felt-
five-years-article. 
73 Dodd-Frank, supra note 58, at Introduction. 
74 See Commissioner Luis A. Aguilar, Public Statement: Statement at an Open Meeting on Dodd-
Frank Act “Clawback” Provision, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (July 1, 2015), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/statement/making-executive-compensation-more-accountable-.html. 
75 Listing Standards, supra note 62, at 41147. 
76 See, e.g., Jesse Fried, Rationalizing the Dodd-Frank Clawback, OTC SPACE: HARVARD LAW 
SCHOOL FORUM (Apr. 18, 2016), http://www.theotcspace.com/content/rationalizing-dodd-frank-
clawback. 
77 Listing Standards, supra note 62, at 41176. 
78 Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Creeping Federalization of Corporate Law, 26 REGULATION 26, 
31 (2003). 
79 Sharp, supra note 28, at 336. 
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In addition, executives might be incentivized to hide accounting errors, rather 
than promote transparency. For example, by triggering clawbacks at the moment 
accounting restatements are required, executives are incentivized to hide, rather 
than correct, past accounting errors that may trigger clawbacks of their own com-
pensation.80 This suggests that agency costs are increased by misalignment of 
shareholder and managerial interests.  
In conclusion, the general purpose of Dodd-Frank is to ensure U.S. economic 
stability and to prevent systemic economic failures. The purpose of § 954 is cor-
rective and equitable, but arguably reaches beyond the general purpose of Dodd-
Frank and creates unfavorable incentives.  
C.  TARP Executive Compensation Provisions 
The executive compensation provisions of the Troubled Asset Relief Pro-
gram (TARP) are codified in 12 U.S.C. § 5221.81 Section 5221 targets the com-
pensation of the “top 5 most highly paid executives of a public company . . . and 
any of the next 20 most highly-compensated employees . . . .”82 Section 5221 only 
applies to those employees of a TARP recipient company that have not repaid the 
U.S. Treasury, which includes, “any entity that has received or will receive finan-
cial assistance under the financial assistance provided under the TARP.”83 Be-
cause § 5221 only applies to TARP recipients with outstanding debts, the number 
of companies subject to § 5221 will diminish as debts are repaid to the Treasury.84 
While TARP funds were initially distributed to eight major banks,85 there were 
eventually 966 TARP recipients.86 780 of which received funds in the form of 
investments,87 subjecting them to § 5221 clawbacks. Of those 780 investment re-
cipients, 734 were banks.88 As of 2017, TARP funds from 41 recipients are still 
outstanding89 and subject to § 5221 clawbacks.  
                                                     
80 Id. 
81 (as amended by the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 § 111(b)(3)(B) and the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 § 7001).  
82 12 U.S.C.A. § 5221(b)(3)(B). 
83 12 U.S.C.A. § 5221(a)(3). 
84 Joseph E. Bachelder III, Clawbacks Under Dodd-Frank and Other Federal Statutes, 
HARVARD L. SCHOOL FORUM ON CORP. GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL REGULATION (June 9, 2011), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2011/06/09/clawbacks-under-dodd-frank-and-other-federal-statutes/ 
85 Murphy, supra note 27, at 104. 
86 The State of the Bailout, PROPUBLICA, https://projects.propublica.org/bailout/list (last updated 
Mar. 6, 2017). 
87 Id. 
88 See CNN, Bailed Out Banks, CNN: MONEY, http://money.cnn.com/news/specials/storysup-
plement/bankbailout/ (last visited Mar 20, 2017). 
89 See State of the Bailout, supra note 86. 
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Clawbacks under § 5221 are triggered by, “statements of earnings, revenues, 
gains, or other criteria that are later found to be materially inaccurate.”90 Ambig-
uously, the “facts and circumstances” determine whether a statement is materially 
inaccurate.91 While personal misconduct is not required,92 knowingly false state-
ments and omissions are always considered materially inaccurate.93 Furthermore, 
§ 5221 clawbacks are not limited to financial misstatements under federal securi-
ties law, because some companies that received TARP funds are not required to 
file with the SEC.94  
The penalty under § 5221 is a mandatory clawback of, “any bonus, retention 
award, or incentive compensation,”95 which is not expressly limited to the excess 
compensation received as a result of the inaccurate financial statement.96 Further-
more, § 5221 applies retroactively97 rather than only to compensation after a fi-
nancial misstatement. Section 5221 also does not reference any time period and 
can apply as far back as the date on which TARP funds were received.98 
A TARP recipient must enforce § 5221 clawbacks, “except to the extent it 
demonstrates that it is unreasonable to do so, for example if the expense of en-
forcing the rights would exceed the amount recovered.”99 It is unclear whether the 
Treasury Secretary or Special Master also have a cause of action to specifically 
enforce clawbacks against a TARP recipient employee. 100 
Like Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank, the purpose of § 5221 is best under-
stood in historical context. TARP was a direct response to the 2008 financial cri-
sis, granting the Treasury Secretary authority to initiate capital injections into fail-
ing companies to prevent national economic collapse.101 Specifically, § 5221 was 
also intended to protect the government’s investment in TARP recipients, and 
reign in excessive Wall Street bonuses. 
                                                     
90 12 U.S.C.A. § 5221(b)(3)(B). 
91 What actions are necessary for a TARP recipient to comply with the standards established 
under section 111(b)(3)(B) of EESA (the “clawback” provision requirement)?, 31 C.F.R. 30.8 (2009). 
92 Bachelder, supra note 84. 
93 What actions are necessary for a TARP recipient to comply with the standards established 
under section 111(b)(3)(B) of EESA (the “clawback” provision requirement)?, 31 C.F.R. 30.8 (2009). 
94 Bachelder, supra note 84. 
95 12 U.S.C.A. § 5221(b)(3)(B). 
96 Bachelder, supra note 84. 
97 Murphy, supra note 27, at 104. 
98 See Bachelder, supra note 84. 
99 What actions are necessary for a TARP recipient to comply with the standards established 
under section 111(b)(3)(B) of EESA (the “clawback” provision requirement)?, 31 C.F.R. 30.8 (2009). 
100 12 U.S.C.A. § 5221(b)(2) (“The Secretary shall require each TARP recipient to meet appro-
priate standards for executive compensation and corporate governance.”); DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL, 
Treasury Regulations Governing Compensation for TARP Participants 16 (June 17, 2009), 
http://www.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/document-library/clsbsbdl_docu-
ment/files/06.16.09.exec.comp.pdf. 
101 U.S. Department of the Treasury, Capital Purchase Program (last updated Oct. 16, 2015), 
https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/TARP-Programs/bank-investment-programs/ 
cap/Pages/overview.aspx. 
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First, § 5221 seeks to avoid another financial crisis by targeting individuals 
most likely to cause systemic financial risk. While executives are often the “deci-
sion makers” at recipient companies, highly-paid non-executive employees 
played a major role in the 2008 financial crisis.102 Section 5221 therefore targets 
five executives, but also the next twenty most highly-compensated employees be-
cause “banks can have non-officer employees making significantly more than the 
highest-paid officers.”103 In addition, § 5221 can apply to unlisted companies not 
required to file with the SEC if they received TARP funds.104 Section 5221 can 
therefore apply to companies such as hedge funds105 that are otherwise unregu-
lated by clawback provisions linked to the SEC financial misstatements.  
Second, the government sought to protect its investment in TARP recipients 
on behalf of American taxpayers.106 For each TARP recipient, the government 
functions either as a shareholder with an equity position or as a lender with a 
creditor position.107 Section 5221 incentivizes executives and highly-paid em-
ployees to protect the government’s financial interest and that of the U.S. tax-
payer.  
Third, legislative history suggests § 5221 was intended to reign in Wall Street 
compensation at the financial institutions responsible for the 2008 crisis. Origi-
nally, Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson’s TARP proposal, “contained no con-
straints on executive compensation, fearing that restrictions would discourage 
firms from selling potentially valuable assets to the government at relatively bar-
gain prices.”108 On the other hand, “[l]imiting executive pay . . . was a long-time 
top priority for Democrats and some Republican congressmen, who viewed the 
‘Wall Street bonus culture’ as a root cause of the financial crisis.”109 Congress 
ultimately prevailed over Paulson. 
                                                     
102 See Origins of the Financial Crisis, supra note 72. 
103 Bachelder, supra note 80. 
104 § 5221 does not single out listed companies, but instead broadly targets any “TARP recipi-
ents.” See 12 U.S.C.A. § 5221(b)(2). 
105 SEC, Fact Answers: Hedge Funds, U.S. SEC: Investor Information (Dec. 4, 2012), 
https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/answershedgehtm.html (“hedge funds are not subject to some of the 
regulations that are designed to protect investors”). 
106 See U.S. Department of the Treasury, supra note 101. 
107 TARP Standards for Compensation and Corporate Governance; Interim Final Rule, 74 Fed. 
Reg. 113 (June 15, 2009) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. 30). 
108 Murphy, supra note 27, at 103. 
109 Id. 
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D.  Dodd-Frank Section 956 
Section 956 imposes requirements on both “Appropriate Federal Regula-
tors”110 and “Covered Financial Institutions.”111 Moreover, § 956 defers rule-mak-
ing obligations to the Appropriate Federal Regulators to determine clawback trig-
gers and penalties for the targets defined in § 956.112 
First, § 956 requires the six Appropriate Federal Regulators to,  
 
jointly prescribe [disclosure] regulations or guidelines [applica-
ble to] each covered financial institution . . . [and to] prohibit 
any types of incentive-based payment arrangement . . . that the 
regulators determine encourages inappropriate risks by covered 
financial institutions (1) by providing . . . excessive compensa-
tion . . . or (2) that could lead to material financial loss to the 
covered financial institution.113  
 
While § 956 does not define “inappropriate risks,” Dodd-Frank’s statement 
of purpose114 suggests that inappropriate risks are risks that jeopardize the finan-
cial stability of the United States and fail to protect consumers from abusive fi-
nancial services practices, similar to financial practices that caused the 2008 Sub-
prime Mortgage Crisis.115 
Second, § 956 requires Covered Financial Institutions to “disclose to the ap-
propriate Federal regulator the structures of all incentive-based compensation ar-
rangements . . . sufficient to determine whether the compensation structure (A) 
                                                     
110 “[T]he term ‘[A]ppropriate Federal [R]egulator’ means the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Board of Directors of the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation . . . the National Credit Union Administration Board, the Securities 
and Exchange Commission, the Federal Housing Finance Agency.” Dodd-Frank, supra note 58, at § 
956(e)(1). 
111 Covered Financial Institutions include, “(A) a depository institution or depository institution 
holding company . . . (B) a broker-dealer . . . (C) a credit union . . . (D) an investment advisor . . . (E) 
the Federal National Mortgage Association; (F) the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation; and 
(G) any other financial institution that the appropriate Federal regulators, jointly, by rule, determine 
should be treated as a covered financial institution for purposes of this section.” Dodd-Frank, supra 
note 58, at § 956(e). The House Committee on Financial Services further explained that, “covered 
financial institutions include banks, broker-dealers, investment advisers, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, 
and possibly a wide array of other companies, such as insurance subsidiaries of a covered institution.” 
H. COMM. ON FIN. SERV. 114TH CONG., THE FINANCIAL CHOICE ACT: CREATING HOPE AND 
OPPORTUNITY FOR INVESTORS, CONSUMERS, AND ENTREPRENEURS: A REPUBLICAN PROPOSAL TO 
REFORM THE FINANCIAL REGULATORY SYSTEM 110 (June 23, 2016) [hereinafter Financial Choice 
Act 1.0]. 
112 See generally Dodd-Frank, supra note 58, at § 956. 
113 Id. at § 956(a), (b). 
114 Id. at Introduction. 
115 See Origins of the Financial Crisis, supra note 72. 
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provides . . . excessive compensation, fees, or . . . (B) could lead to material fi-
nancial loss to the covered financial institution.”116 Within these Covered Finan-
cial Institutions, § 956 targets, “an executive officer, employee, director, or prin-
cipal shareholder of [a] covered financial institution . . . [that implements] an 
incentive-based payment arrangement . . . [and has] assets [equal to or greater] 
than $1 Billion.”117 On one hand, § 956 targets a broader scope of employees than 
any other clawback statute; on the other hand, § 956 targets a narrow group of 
companies (Covered Financial Institutions) similar to TARP, which almost exclu-
sively targets financial institutions as well.118 
The purpose of § 956 is to ensure U.S. economic stability and prevent sys-
temic economic failures.119 Section 956 specifically addresses the “evidence that 
flawed incentive-based compensation practices in the financial industry were 
one of many factors contributing to the financial crisis that began in 2007,”120 
because § 956 is triggered by excessive compensation or compensation arrange-
ments that could lead to material financial loss. By targeting a large group of 
employees at a small group of financial institutions, the combined scope of § 956 
more directly addresses Dodd-Frank’s general purpose121 than § 954, which may 
reach beyond Dodd-Frank’s general purpose.122 
1.  Dodd-Frank Section 956 Proposed Rules 
The Appropriate Federal Regulators proposed regulations in 2011 pursuant 
to § 956123 which were revised and re-proposed in 2016.124 As of July 2017, the 
2016 proposal (Proposed Rules) is still pending, and likely will not apply to Cov-
ered Financial Institutions any earlier than 2019.125 The Proposed Rules would 
require compensation deferral arrangements, but the triggers, penalties, and en-
forcement of clawbacks are ultimately discretionary.126 
                                                     
116 Dodd-Frank, supra note 58, at § 956(a). 
117 Id. at § 956. 
118 State of the Bailout, supra note 86. 
119 Dodd-Frank, supra note 58, at Introduction. 
120 Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 81 Fed. Reg. 37669, 37674 (proposed June 
10, 2016) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 1232, 236, 372, 42, 741, 751, 240, 275, 303), https://www. 
federalregister.gov/documents/2016/06/10/2016-11788/incentive-based-compensation-arrangements. 
121 Dodd-Frank, supra note 58, at Introduction. 
122 See Fried, supra note 76. 
123 Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 76 Fed. Reg. 21169 (proposed April 14, 2011) 
(to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 1232, 236, 372, 42, 563, 741, 751, 248). 
124 See generally Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 81 Fed. Reg. 37669, supra note 
120.  
125 “The compliance date of the proposed rule would be no later than the beginning of the first 
calendar quarter that begins at least 540 days after a final rule is published in the Federal Register. The 
proposed rule would not apply to any incentive-based compensation plan with a performance period 
that begins before the compliance date.” Id. at 37679.  
126 See generally id. at 37669.  
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The Proposed Rules would target Senior Executive Officers127 and Signifi-
cant Risk Takers,128 because these are the individuals who “initiate activities that 
generate risk of material financial loss . . .[and] play an important role in identi-
fying, addressing, and mitigating that risk.”129 The Proposed Rules would only 
target these individuals at Covered Institutions,130 which are distinguished by 
size as Level 1 (assets greater than $250 billion) and Level 2 (assets between $50 
billion and $250 billion).131 
 Clawbacks under the Proposed Rules would be triggered if “the covered 
institution determines that the senior executive officer or significant risk-taker en-
gaged in misconduct that resulted in significant financial or reputational harm to 
the covered institution, fraud, or intentional misrepresentation of information used 
to determine the senior executive officer or significant risk-taker’s incentive-
based compensation.”132  
 Furthermore, the Proposed Rules clarify two significant ambiguities re-
garding the clawback policies Covered Institutions would be required to imple-
ment. First, excessive compensation is defined as compensation that is “unreason-
able or disproportionate to the value of the services performed by a covered 
person,” taking into account various factors.133 Second, incentive-based compen-
sation would “encourage inappropriate risks that could lead to material financial 
                                                     
127 “Senior Executive Officer” is defined as a, “person who holds the title or, without regard to 
title, salary, or compensation, performs the function of one or more of the following positions at a 
covered institution for any period of time in the relevant performance period: President, chief execu-
tive officer (CEO), executive chairman, chief operating officer, chief financial officer, chief invest-
ment officer, chief legal officer, chief lending officer, chief risk officer, chief compliance officer, chief 
audit executive, chief credit officer, chief accounting officer, or head of a major business line or control 
function.” Id. at 37691.  
128 “Significant Risk-Takers” are defined as, “individuals who are not senior executive officers 
but are in the position to put a Level 1 or Level 2 covered institution at risk of material financial loss 
. . . .” which occurs if either of two tests are met: “The [Relative Compensation Test] is based on the 
amounts of annual base salary and incentive-based compensation of a covered person relative to other 
covered persons working for the covered institution and its affiliate covered institutions . . . [and] The 
[Exposure Test] is based on whether the covered person has authority to commit or expose 0.5 percent 
or more of the capital of the covered institution or an affiliate that is itself a covered institution.” Id. 
at 37691–92.  
129 Id. at 37691.  
130 The Proposed Rules clarify that Covered Financial Institutions are more clearly defined as 
any institution regulated by the six Appropriate Federal Regulators. Id. at 37684. 
131 Id. at 37687. The Proposed Rules also define “Level 3” Covered Financial Institutions, to 
which clawbacks would not apply. Id. 
132 Id. at 37681. 
133 The factors considered include: 1) The combined value of all compensation, fees, or benefits 
provided to a covered person; 2) The compensation history of the covered person and other individuals 
with comparable expertise at the covered institution; 3) The financial condition of the covered institu-
tion; 4) Compensation practices at comparable institutions, based upon such factors as asset size, ge-
ographic location, and the complexity of the covered institution's operations and assets; 5) For post-
employment benefits, the projected total cost and benefit to the covered institution; 6) any connection 
between the covered person and any fraudulent act or omission, breach of trust or fiduciary duty, or 
insider abuse with regard to the covered institution. Id. at 37679.  
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loss to the covered institution,” unless certain conditions are met.134 
The penalty under the Proposed Rules would be complicated by mandatory 
compensation deferral arrangements, requiring portions of compensation to vest 
pro rata over a minimum number of years. The specific requirements vary based 
on 1) Level 1 and Level 2 Institutions, 2) Senior Executive Officers and Signifi-
cant Risk Takers, and 3) Long-Term Incentive Compensation Plans 135 and Qual-
ifying Incentive-Based Compensation.136 The following table137 consolidates the 
minimum compensation deferral amounts under the Proposed Rules. 
 
 
Compensation not yet vested would be subject to forfeiture or downward ad-
justment (essentially ex ante clawbacks), and vested compensation would be sub-
ject to clawbacks.138 The Proposed Rules would require Level 1 and Level 2 Cov-
ered Institutions to 1) consider imposing forfeiture or downward adjustment of 
unvested, deferred compensation under certain circumstances139 and 2) adopt pol-
icies empowering the Covered Institution to clawback vested compensation for at 
                                                     
134 Those conditions are that the compensation arrangement: “[1] Appropriately balances risk 
and reward; [2] Is compatible with effective risk management and controls; and [3] Is supported by 
effective governance.” Id. Furthermore, Incentive-based compensation would not “appropriately bal-
ance risk and reward, unless it: [1] Includes financial and non-financial measures of performance; [2] 
Is designed to allow non-financial measures of performance to override financial measures of perfor-
mance, when appropriate; and [3] Is subject to adjustment to reflect actual losses, inappropriate risks 
taken, compliance deficiencies, or other measures or aspects of financial and non-financial perfor-
mance.” Id. at 37679–80. 
135 “Long-term incentive plan means a plan to provide incentive-based compensation that is 
based on a performance period of at least three years.” Id. at 37801.  
136 “Qualifying incentive-based compensation means the amount of incentive-based compensa-
tion . . . excluding amounts awarded . . . under a long-term incentive plan.” Id. 
137 This table was consolidated by the author using the SEC’s Proposed Rules pursuant to Dodd-
Frank Section 956. See id. at 37679–80.  
138 Id. 
139 Those conditions are: “[1] Poor financial performance attributable to a significant deviation 
 
 
Senior Executive 
Officer 
Significant Risk 
Taker 
Level 1 
Institu-
tions 
Qualifying Incen-
tive-Based Compen-
sation 
60% for at least 4 
years 
50% for at least 4 
years 
Long-Term Incen-
tive Plan 
60% for at least 2 
years 
50% for at least 2 
years 
Level 2 
Institu-
tions 
Qualifying Incen-
tive-Based Compen-
sation 
50% for at least 3 
years 
40% for at least 3 
years 
Long Term Incen-
tive Plan 
50% for at least 1 
year 
40% for at least 1 
year 
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least, “seven years following the date on which such compensation vests.”140 
Compensation recovery is thus both forward-looking (forfeiture and downward 
adjustment)  
and backward-looking (clawbacks) under the Proposed Rules.  
Clawbacks would also be discretionary141 and enforced only by the Covered 
Institution.142 Level 1 and Level 2 companies would be required to maintain pol-
icies and procedures that “[i]dentify and describe the role of any employees, com-
mittees, or groups authorized to make incentive-based compensation decisions, 
including when discretion is authorized; [and] [d]escribe how discretion is exer-
cised to achieve balance.”143  
The purpose of the Proposed Rules is consistent with the purpose of § 956. 
For example, the Proposed Rules distinguish between larger Level 1 and Level 2 
financial institutions because, “larger financial institutions can present greater po-
tential systemic risks . . . to U.S. financial stability.”144 In addition, deferral re-
quirements were proposed to function as a “tool to balance risk and reward.”145 
In conclusion, the Proposed Rules further clarify the mandatory clawback 
policies required by § 956. Although the Proposed Rules would require mandatory 
compensation deferral, the triggers, penalties, and enforcement of clawbacks and 
the forfeiture would ultimately be discretionary. 
2.  Analysis of Dodd-Frank Section 956 Proposed Rules 
The Proposed Rules have yet to gain clear support. Some argue that the Pro-
posed Rules are under-inclusive and fail to achieve the purpose of § 956, while 
others argue that the Proposed Rules are over-inclusive, unwise public policy. 
This argument stems from the basis that: 1) the deferral period is too short; 
2) clawbacks should be mandatory, not discretionary; and 3) clawback triggers 
are too limited.146 First, the deferral period is too short. Several U.S. Senators 
have argued that the effects of executive wrongdoing often manifest over a much 
                                                     
from the covered institution's risk parameters set forth in the covered institution's policies and proce-
dures; [2] Inappropriate risk-taking, regardless of the impact on financial performance; [3] Material 
risk management or control failures; [4] Non-compliance with statutory, regulatory, or supervisory 
standards resulting in enforcement or legal action brought by a federal or state regulator or agency, or 
a requirement that the covered institution report a restatement of a financial statement to correct a 
material error; and [5] Other aspects of conduct or poor performance as defined by the covered insti-
tution.” Id. at 37681.  
140 Id.  
141 Id. (Clawbacks are only triggered “if the covered institution determines . . .”). 
142 Id. 
143 Id. at 37682. 
144 Id. at 37716.  
145 Id. at 37717. 
146 See Robert Menendez et. al., Comment Letter from Certain Senators Regarding Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking on Incentive-Based Compensation Pursuant to Section 956 of the Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform Act (Oct. 26, 2016), https://www.menendez.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Incentive-
Based-Pay-Letter-Wells-Fargo-Sec-956-2016-10-26.pdf [hereinafter Senate Letter]. 
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longer time-frame than the maximum four-year deferral arrangement.147 For ex-
ample, in the recent Wells Fargo fraudulent accounts scandal,148 fraudulent bank 
accounts dating back to 2005 were not publicly recognized until 2013.149 Wells 
Fargo clawbacks have not been triggered under current statutory clawback pro-
visions and would not be triggered under the Proposed Rules. Instead, clawbacks 
only occurred under the company’s voluntary contractual clawback policy,150 
and only after CEO John Stumpf’s highly-publicized Senate Banking Committee 
Hearing.151  
Second, clawbacks should be mandatory, not discretionary. Senators have 
also argued that companies rarely enforce clawbacks that are discretionary.152 
For example, Managerial Power Theory153 might explain the rare enforcement if 
managerial influence over directors curtails enforcement. On the other hand, 
some research suggests that rare enforcement may be due to increased compli-
ance with securities disclosures.154  
Third, the proposed clawback triggers are too limited. Because the trigger 
under the Proposed Rules is limited to fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct 
of individual employees, it is unclear whether negligence or oversight failures 
would trigger clawbacks.155 Dodd-Frank’s purpose was to prevent systemic eco-
nomic risk in response to the 2008 financial crisis, and negligence and oversight 
failures contributed to that crisis.156 
Others argue that the Proposed Rules are over-inclusive because: 1) the Pro-
posed Rules cover too many issuers, executives, and types of compensation; 2) 
the Proposed Rules will drive talented employees to seek jobs where regulations 
do not apply; and 3) the government should not intervene in public sector deci-
sions. 
First, the Proposed Rules cover too many issuers, executives, and types of 
                                                     
147 See Senate Letter, supra note 146. 
148 See discussion infra Section V.A.2. 
149 Ian Mount, Wells Fargo’s Fake Accounts May Go Back More Than 10 Years, FORTUNE: 
FINANCE (Oct. 12, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/10/12/wells-fargo-fake-accounts-scandal/. 
150 Notice of Annual Meeting of Stockholders, WELLS FARGO & Co. 47–50 (Mar. 16, 2016), 
https://www08.wellsfargomedia.com/assets/pdf/about/investor-relations/annual-reports/2016-proxy-
statement.pdf. 
151 See, e.g., SENATOR ELIZABETH WARREN, Senator Elizabeth Warren questions Wells Fargo 
CEO John Stumpf at Banking Committee Hearing, YOUTUBE (Sept. 20, 2016), https://www.youtube. 
com/watch?v=xJhkX74D10M. 
152 See Senate Letter, supra note 146. 
153 Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried, Pay Without Performance: Overview of the Issues, 17 J. OF 
APPLIED CORP. FIN. 8-19 (2005), available at http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article= 
1316&context=harvard_olin. 
154 Gretchen Morgenson, Clawbacks? They’re Still a Rare Breed, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 28, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/29/business/clawbacks-theyre-still-a-rare-breed.html. 
155 Senate Letter, supra note 146. 
156 See Origins of the Financial Crisis, supra note 72. 
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compensation.157 As a result, executives may engage in actual earnings manage-
ment rather than artificial misstatements, forego associated, valuable projects 
that involve difficult accounting judgments, and thus, risk accounting misstate-
ments, overinvest in financial reporting to protect themselves at a high cost to 
shareholders, or otherwise attempt to reduce the clawback penalty.158 
Second, the Proposed Rules may drive talented employees to seek jobs 
where regulations do not apply. The proposed “CHOICE Act 1.0” argues that, 
“[f]ar from mitigating systemic risk, driving talented professionals out of the fi-
nancial services sector only increases the likelihood of a future financial cri-
sis.”159 Over-inclusive clawbacks may incentivize highly-compensated employ-
ees to leave Covered Institutions for smaller banks, hedge funds, or non-U.S. 
companies.160 As a result, systemic financial risk is not eliminated; Significant 
Risk Takers would merely be shuffled amongst different companies or possibly 
different countries.  
Third, the government should not intervene in private sector decisions. For 
example, the Republican’s Financial CHOICE Act 1.0 would repeal § 956, be-
cause it gives too much power to the government to intervene in private sector 
compensation decisions.161 The CHOICE Act 1.0 asserts that,  
 
[o]nly in Washington does the idea of giving government bu-
reaucrats – some of whom have never worked in the private 
sector – the authority to dictate ‘incentive-based compensation’ 
standards at private companies make any sense at all. Worse 
yet, the specific statutory directive on compensation is, like 
much else in the Dodd-Frank Act, riddled with vague and open-
ended terms that essentially give regulators unbridled discretion 
to design compensation packages.162  
 
In conclusion, the Proposed Rules have yet to gain clear support while they 
are currently pending approval. Some argue that the Proposed Rules are under-
inclusive because the deferral period is too short, the penalty should be manda-
tory, and the triggers are too limited; others argue that they are over-inclusive, 
because the targets are too broad, unfavorable incentives are created, and the 
government should not interfere with the private sector.  
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III.  VOLUNTARY CONTRACTUAL CLAWBACK POLICIES 
Contractual clawback policies are the wildcard of clawback mechanisms. 
Statutory provisions create minimum clawback requirements, but contractual 
clawback policies often reiterate statutory clawback requirements or additionally 
“serve to fill gaps in existing recoupment doctrine.”163 Contractual policies are 
becoming more popular; one report found that in 2003, less than 1% of companies 
had clawback policies, while in 2010, 39.8% of S&P 500 companies had publicly 
disclosed clawback policies.164 By 2009, 73% of Fortune 100 companies had pub-
licly disclosed clawback policies,165 which increased to 86% in 2013.166 Compa-
nies may be adopting these policies in anticipation of the Dodd-Frank § 956 Pro-
posed Rules. 
Contractual clawback policies can be tailored to target anyone the company 
chooses. Trends suggest that most contractual clawbacks are triggered by finan-
cial restatements and require misconduct in ultra-large companies to a greater de-
gree than the average listed company. For example, one study of companies in the 
Dow Jones Industrial Average167 (DJIA) found that clawbacks are triggered solely 
by a financial restatement in 63% of companies, either by a financial restatement 
or revision of other performance metrics in 17% of companies, solely by miscon-
duct in 13% of companies, and by “other” triggers in 7% of companies.168 Collec-
tively, financial restatements trigger clawbacks in 80% of DJIA companies,169 
suggesting that shareholders and investors simply demanded accurate financial 
disclosures, even when not required by federal statute. 
The DJIA study also found that 60% of companies require culpability, 30% 
do not require culpability, and 10% of companies cannot be clearly identified into 
either category.170 By contrast, a 2015 study by the SEC of all listed companies 
found that only 33% specifically required misconduct.171 This dichotomy suggests 
that ultra-large companies prefer fault-based triggers, while the average listed 
companies prefer no-fault triggers. 
The penalties under contractual clawback provisions vary widely. The 2015 
SEC study found that 61.5% of listed companies provided for recovery of any 
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incentive-based compensation; 73% provided for recovery of excess incentive-
based compensation; and 90% had a look-back period of three years or longer.172 
The DJIA study found that only 3% of DJIA companies provided for recovery of 
any incentive-based compensation; 20% provided for recovery of all or part of 
incentive-based compensation; 27% provided for recovery of excess incentive-
based compensation; 7% used unconventional methods; and 43% did not disclose 
the amount subject to clawbacks.173 
There is a clear preference for discretionary enforcement of contractual claw-
backs. The DJIA study found that 100% of DJIA companies have some form of 
discretion to enforce clawbacks: 80% of companies have complete discretion, 
13% have discretion to determine culpability, and 7% have discretion if the com-
pany does not find the employee culpable.174 
The purposes of contractual policies vary, but they are most prominently used 
for 1) calming public outrage in the event of public scandal, 2) incentivizing de-
sired behaviors, and 3) reimbursing the company or its shareholders.  
First and most significantly, contractual clawbacks calm public outrage in the 
event of public scandal.175 Contractual policies are often only enforced in the 
event of public scandal, and “boards pull clawbacks out of their hip pocket only 
when politically expedient, [which] will undermine their effectiveness as a risk 
management tool.”176 Furthermore, contractual clawback policies may decrease 
the likelihood of federal clawback enforcement, because “after the implementa-
tion of a recovery policy, an auditor is less likely to report a material weakness in 
an issuer’s internal controls over financial reporting.”177  
Second, contractual clawback policies create incentives that align share-
holder and managerial interests. Contractual clawback policies have been referred 
to as a “commitment device” whereby executives are more likely to follow prom-
ises they made to their “future self.”178 Shareholders benefit when managers fulfill 
their promises to shareholders. Similarly, some contractual policies expressly 
seek to punish executives for specified conduct, unlike statutory clawbacks. The 
market also tends to impose its own penalties for financial restatements; one study
 
found that from 2005–2012, the market capitalization of the average issuer de-
clined by 2.3% after announcing a significant financial restatement.179 
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Companies can also tailor contractual policies to their self-determined inter-
ests, rather than to interests defined by generalized statutes. Some argue that stat-
utory clawbacks are unnecessary for this reason because federal requirements dis-
rupt the ability of the shareholders and directors to decide their own rights and 
powers.180  
Third, contractual clawbacks compensate both the company and sharehold-
ers.181 Shareholders may be better served by contractual clawbacks, because the 
company can recover compensation more efficiently than the SEC.182  
In sum, although there are clear trends that companies favor discretionary 
enforcement and no-fault triggers caused by financial restatements, there are no 
clear trends for the amount of compensation subject to clawbacks. In addition, the 
purposes behind contractual policies vary widely. 
IV.  COMPREHENSIVE CLAWBACK COVERAGE 
This Part condenses the targets, triggers, penalties, enforcement bodies, and 
purposes of each clawback mechanism to create the “Comprehensive Clawback 
Coverage.” The Comprehensive Clawback Coverage provides the clearest and 
most concise description of the legal framework for executive compensation 
clawbacks. 
First, targeted individuals are determined solely by their employment posi-
tion under Sarbanes-Oxley § 304 and Dodd-Frank § 954. More specifically, Sar-
banes-Oxley § 304 targets only the CEO and the CFO, while Dodd-Frank § 954 
targets any current or former executive officer of the issuer who received incen-
tive-based compensation.  
Targeted individuals are determined by a hybrid of position and compensa-
tion level under Dodd-Frank § 956 and TARP. The Dodd-Frank § 956 Proposed 
Rules target Senior Executive Officers and Significant Risk Takers. TARP targets 
the top five most highly paid executives of a public company and the next twenty 
most highly-compensated employees. Contractual clawback policies target any 
employee who contracts for a clawback provision.  
Clawback mechanisms target various groups of companies. Like Sarbanes-
Oxley § 304, which targets approximately 4,333 companies required to file with 
the SEC,183 Dodd-Frank § 954 targets approximately 4,845 listed companies.184 
By contrast, TARP and Dodd-Frank § 956 specifically target financial institu-
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tions. TARP targets TARP recipients with outstanding TARP funds (41 compa-
nies in 2017185), and the Dodd-Frank § 956 Proposed Rules target Covered Finan-
cial Institutions based on asset size. In addition, voluntary contractual clawback 
policies have been adopted by nearly 90% of Fortune 100 companies186 and 40% 
of S&P 500 companies.187  
Second, most clawbacks are triggered by some form of disclosure inaccuracy. 
Sarbanes-Oxley § 304 (misstatements) and Dodd-Frank § 954 (restatements) are 
triggered by material inaccuracies under federal securities law. TARP is triggered 
by a materially inaccurate financial statement but is not limited to statements re-
quired by federal securities law. Most voluntary contractual clawback policies are 
also triggered by financial restatements.188 By contrast, clawbacks under Dodd-
Frank § 956 are triggered if the target employee “engaged in misconduct that re-
sulted in significant financial or reputational harm to the covered institution, 
fraud, or intentional misrepresentation of information used to determine . . . in-
centive-based compensation.” 
Clawback mechanisms are divided on whether misconduct is required. While 
Sarbanes-Oxley § 304 and the Dodd-Frank § 956 Proposed Rules require miscon-
duct, Dodd-Frank § 954 and TARP do not. The most recent draft of the CHOICE 
Act 2.0 would add an element of misconduct to § 954 by imposing clawbacks 
only where the executive “had control or authority over the financial reporting.”189 
In addition, misconduct is required by voluntary contractual clawback policies in 
ultra-large companies to a greater degree than the average listed company.190  
Clawbacks are discretionary under the Dodd-Frank § 956 Proposed Rules and 
nearly all contractual clawback policies.191 For example, contractual clawbacks 
were discretionary in the Wells Fargo fraudulent account scandal and the Walmart 
foreign bribery scandal.192 By contrast, clawbacks are mandatory under Sarbanes-
Oxley § 304 and Dodd-Frank § 954 (which requires target companies to adopt 
policies that “will” claw back compensation under certain circumstances). Claw-
backs are also mandatory under TARP unless the company can demonstrate en-
forcement is “unreasonable.” 
Third, the clawback penalty consists of any incentive-based compensation 
under the Dodd-Frank § 956 Proposed Rules (subject to mandatory deferral re-
quirements) and TARP. Sarbanes-Oxley § 304 also claws back any bonuses and 
profits realized from the sale of stock. By contrast, Dodd-Frank § 954 limits claw-
backs to the excess of what would have been paid to the executive officer under 
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the accounting restatement. Clawback penalties under voluntary contractual claw-
back policies vary widely among companies. For SEC-regulated companies, 
61.5% provide for recovery of any incentive-based compensation and 73% pro-
vide for recovery of excess incentive-based compensation; for DJIA companies, 
27% claw back the portion erroneously awarded, while 23% claw back all or part 
of the amount realized (43% not reporting).193  
The time period subject to clawbacks is 12 months after accounting misstate-
ment under Sarbanes-Oxley § 304; 3 years preceding an accounting restatement 
under Dodd-Frank § 954; and any time during which TARP funds are outstanding 
under TARP. In addition, one study found that 90% of DJIA companies had a 
look-back period of 3 years or longer. Under the Dodd-Frank § 956 Proposed 
Rules, clawback and forfeiture time periods are dependent on mandatory compen-
sation deferral requirements. Clawbacks are forward-looking from the moment of 
the clawback trigger under Sarbanes-Oxley § 304 and the Dodd-Frank § 956 Pro-
posed Rules on Forfeiture, but backward-looking under Dodd-Frank § 954, 
TARP, and the Dodd-Frank § 956 Proposed Rules on Clawbacks. 
Fourth, clawbacks are enforced only by the SEC under Sarbanes-Oxley § 
304. By contrast, clawbacks are enforced by the company under TARP, Dodd-
Frank § 954, and the Dodd-Frank § 965 Proposed Rules—although the SEC and 
Listing Exchanges also have tangential enforcement obligations. In addition, vol-
untary contractual clawback policies are enforced by companies under state law. 
Fifth, the purpose of clawbacks mechanisms vary widely. Purposes under 
Sarbanes-Oxley § 304 include encouraging proactive oversight, equity, and pun-
ishment (though not explicitly). TARP, Dodd-Frank § 954, and Dodd-Frank § 956 
are intended to ensure national economic stability, although Dodd-Frank § 954 
arguably reaches beyond this purpose by broadly reforming U.S. corporate law.194 
TARP was additionally intended to protect the government’s investment in TARP 
recipients and reign in excessive Wall Street bonuses. Contractual clawback pol-
icies are often used to calm public outrage, reimburse the company, and incentiv-
ize desired behavior.195 
Clawback purposes expose the alignment of interests under each clawback 
mechanism. Sarbanes-Oxley § 304 aligns the interests of managers and investors 
by preventing manipulation of financial disclosures. Dodd-Frank § 954 aligns the 
interests of managers and society by preventing another economic crisis. TARP 
aligns the interests of managers and the government by protecting the govern-
ment’s financial investment. Voluntary contractual clawback policies align the 
managers’ interests with the company’s interests, as defined by the board in ex-
ecutive employment contracts, by granting the board discretion to enforce claw-
backs.  
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V.  THE FLAW: CLAWBACKS INCREASE AGENCY COSTS 
Michael Jensen and William Meckling first identified the “agency problem” 
in executive compensation: conflicts of interest between companies and execu-
tives generate additional costs for companies that are ultimately borne by share-
holders.196 Clawbacks likely increase agency costs by 1) failing to prevent exec-
utive wrongdoing, 2) possibly increasing executive compensation in the form of 
a “risk premium,” 3) incentivizing the circumvention of clawback rules, and 4) 
driving away talented employees.  
A.  Clawbacks Increase Agency Costs by Failing to Prevent Costly 
Executive Wrongdoing  
Clawbacks likely increase agency costs by failing to prevent costly execu-
tive wrongdoing, because 1) the Comprehensive Clawback Coverage is weak, 
and 2) discretionary clawbacks are often not enforced in relation to the underly-
ing wrongdoing, as illustrated by case studies of Wells Fargo and Walmart. 
1.  The Comprehensive Clawback Coverage is Weak 
Kevin Murphy explained that the statutory “‘clawback’ provision of Sar-
banes-Oxley—which was subsequently extended in the TARP legislation and 
Dodd-Frank . . . was notable mostly for its ineffectiveness.”197 On the surface, 
Sarbanes-Oxley § 304 applies to thousands of SEC-regulated companies, but only 
the CEO and the CFO are targeted, and clawbacks have been enforced against no 
more than twenty-five individuals as of 2017.198 In addition, TARP only applies 
to a diminishing group of financial institutions.199 While Dodd-Frank § 954 tar-
gets a broad group of employees and a broad group of companies, the penalty 
clawing back excess realized compensation is merely corrective and not puni-
tive.200 In addition, contractual clawback policies and the Dodd-Frank § 956 Pro-
posed Rules provide for discretionary enforcement, which is often used to calm 
public outrage after a scandal, rather than prevent the underlying wrongdoing.201 
The Comprehensive Clawback Coverage is therefore too weak and disorganized 
to effectively deter costly executive wrongdoing.  
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2.  Case Studies 
Two case studies demonstrate that discretionary clawback enforcement is of-
ten tied to a company’s financial success rather than the underlying wrongdoing. 
First, discretionary contractual clawbacks were enforced in the Wells Fargo fraud-
ulent account scandal only when the company suffered long-term financial harm. 
Second, discretionary contractual clawbacks were never enforced in the Walmart 
foreign bribery scandal, where the company did not suffer long-term financial 
harm. 
i.  The Wells Fargo Fraudulent Account Scandal 
 
Wells Fargo has maintained a contractual policy authorizing clawbacks for 
causing “reputational or other harm to the Company.”202 Since 2002, former Wells 
Fargo CEO John Stumpf, who then served as head of Wells Fargo’s southwest 
and western regional banking groups, knew of employees’ systemic practice to 
fraudulently open customer accounts in order to meet internal sales targets.203 
Over the next decade, executives were consistently notified about similar fraud.204 
In 2010, the Office of the Comptroller, one of the Appropriate Federal Reg-
ulators enforcing Dodd-Frank clawbacks,205 failed to notify the public or take ac-
tion against Wells Fargo,206 admitting in 2017 to “several missed opportunities to 
perform comprehensive analyses and take more timely action beginning in 
2010.”207 As of 2017, statutory clawbacks have not been enforced, most likely due 
to Regulator apathy and enforcement difficulty.208 
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In 2013, the Los Angeles Times publicly exposed the scandal for the first 
time, resulting in public outrage.209 Clawbacks were not enforced under Wells 
Fargo’s contractual policy210 immediately after the public exposure, even though 
employees fraudulently opened more than two million fake accounts.211 Instead, 
the company fired 5,300 employees and paid $185 million in government fines.212 
On September 20, 2016, public outrage peaked when Wells Fargo’s CEO 
Stumpf appeared before the Senate Banking Committee, famously scolded by 
Congresswoman Elizabeth Warren.213 Just five days later, Wells Fargo enforced 
the contractual clawback policy, likely under the “reputational harm” provision.214 
Stumpf forfeited $41 million in bonuses and unvested equity awards;215 Carrie 
Tolstedt, head of the Community Bank division, forfeited $19 million.216 On April 
10, 2017, Wells Fargo enforced additional clawbacks; Stumpf forfeited an addi-
tional $28 million and Tolstedt forfeited an additional $47.3 million. In total, 
Wells Fargo clawed back more $180 million from executives.217 
Wells Fargo’s clawback enforcement is correlated to the company’s financial 
success, as measured by market capitalization, suggesting that clawbacks only 
occurred in relation to the company’s financial success and not in relation to the 
underlying wrongdoing.218 
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Wells Fargo did not enforce clawbacks from 2002 to 2016 when the company 
knew about the fraudulent activity, but rather when market capitalization in-
creased by $218 billion.219 Wells Fargo’s market capitalization was $77 billion in 
2002 when Stumpf first learned of the fraudulent activity, which rose to $130 
billion in 2010 during the OCC investigation, which further rose to $220 billion 
in 2013 after the LA Times article, which again rose to $295 billion in June 
2016.220 After each significant event where Wells Fargo’s financial position did 
not suffer, Wells Fargo declined to enforce clawbacks.  
Wells Fargo finally enforced clawbacks in 2016 and 2017 when market cap-
italization declined by $61 billion and failed to recover.221 Wells Fargo’s market 
capitalization dropped from $295 billion in June 2016 to $234 billion in Septem-
ber 2016 when Stumpf appeared before the Senate Banking Committee;222 con-
tractual clawbacks were enforced just five days later.223 By March 2017, Wells 
Fargo’s $276 billion market capitalization failed to recover to its 2016 heights.224 
By contrast, the market capitalization of a comparable bank, JPMorgan Chase, 
grew by $87 billion over the same period to reach an all-time high after President 
Trump’s election.225 Failing to recover while peer banks flourished, Wells Fargo 
enforced additional clawbacks in April 2017.226 After each significant event 
where Wells Fargo’s financial position suffered, Wells Fargo enforced clawbacks.  
In conclusion, Wells Fargo enforced clawbacks during periods of financial 
harm, but not during financial success. After events causing “reputational harm” 
where market capitalization nevertheless increased by $218 billion, clawbacks 
were not enforced; after events causing “reputational harm” where the company’s 
market capitalization declined by $61 billion, clawbacks were enforced.227 En-
forcement discretion was therefore not tied to the underlying wrongdoing; other-
wise, clawbacks would have been enforced on several occasions after 2002.  
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ii.  Walmart Foreign Bribery Scandal 
 
Clawbacks were not enforced in connection with the Walmart foreign bribery 
scandal.228 Walmart has maintained a contractual policy permitting discretionary 
clawbacks if an executive “engaged in any act deemed inimical to the best inter-
ests of Wal-Mart.”229 In 2003, Walmart executives allegedly facilitated or failed 
to prevent bribery of Mexican government officials to change zoning laws for new 
Walmart stores.230 In 2005, Walmart’s internal compliance investigators found 
“clear confirmation that . . . top executives at Wal-Mart de Mexico were well 
aware of the [bribery] payments.231 In 2012, the New York Times publicly ex-
posed the scandal, resulting in public outrage.232 
Walmart has never exercised discretion to enforce clawbacks for this “inim-
ical” scandal, and although shareholders demanded Walmart amend its policy to 
include clawbacks triggered by unethical conduct, their demand was rejected in 
2013.233 In addition, state litigation234 and federal litigation235 costing Walmart 
more than $820 million in legal expenses236 were eventually dismissed.237 
Walmart’s market capitalization was $207 billion in January 2003 when the 
foreign bribery began,238 which rose to $210 billion in January 2012 just before 
public discovery,239 which fell by $17 billion in April 2012 after public discov-
ery240 but recovered back to $213 billion by the end of the same month.241 In April 
2017, Walmart’s market capitalization reached $217 billion.  
Walmart did not enforce clawbacks during periods of financial success. After 
“inimical acts” where market capitalization increased, Walmart did not enforce 
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clawbacks. After “inimical acts” causing financial harm followed by quick recov-
ery, Walmart did not enforce clawbacks either. Enforcement discretion was there-
fore not tied to executives’ bribery; otherwise, clawbacks would have been en-
forced on several occasions after 2003. 
iii.  Findings: Discretionary Clawbacks are Enforced in Relation to 
Financial Success Rather than the Underlying Wrongdoing 
 
Effectively, Wells Fargo and Walmart utilized discretionary clawback en-
forcement as a public relations tool to maximize profits rather than as a deterrent 
for executive wrongdoing. Like Wells Fargo, which could have enforced contrac-
tual clawbacks several times after 2002 under its “reputational harm” policy, 
Walmart could have enforced clawbacks several times after 2003 under its “inim-
ical acts” policy. Like Wells Fargo, which did not enforce clawbacks from 2002–
2016 after a public scandal when market capitalization nevertheless increased, 
Walmart did not enforce clawbacks from 2003–2016 after a public scandal when 
market capitalization nevertheless increased. When Wells Fargo’s market capital-
ization failed to recover after negative publicity from 2016–2017, clawbacks were 
finally enforced; when Walmart’s market capitalization quickly recovered after 
negative publicity in April 2017, clawbacks were not enforced. Both companies 
apply discretionary enforcement in relation to the company’s financial success; 
neither company applies discretionary enforcement in relation to the underlying 
wrongdoing. 
This phenomenon may be attributable to the inconsistent alignment of inter-
ests between statutory and contractual clawback mechanisms. Contractual claw-
backs seek to align company interests with shareholders’ financial interests, while 
Sarbanes-Oxley, Dodd-Frank, and TARP all seek, on some level, to align com-
pany interests with public interests. This misalignment might explain a more fun-
damental problem with clawback provisions like Dodd-Frank § 956, which re-
quire companies to adopt clawback policies intended for the government’s 
interests, yet the policies are crafted to achieve the company’s interests. The Wells 
Fargo and Walmart scandals illustrate how discretionary clawbacks can be used 
as a strategic public relations tool. 
3.  Conclusion 
Clawbacks likely increase agency costs by failing to prevent costly execu-
tive wrongdoing. The Comprehensive Clawback Coverage is too weak and dis-
organized to effectively deter executive wrongdoing. In addition, two case stud-
ies illustrate how discretionary clawbacks are enforced in relation to the financial 
success rather than the underlying wrongdoing: Wells Fargo only enforced claw-
backs when the company failed to recover from financial harm; Walmart never 
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enforced clawbacks despite shareholder pressure. As a result, each company in-
curred expenses, including government fines, legal fees, and stock price decline, 
that negatively impacted shareholders.  
B.  Clawbacks May be Increasing Executive Compensation as a “Risk 
Premium” 
Kevin Murphy identified the concept of a “risk premium” in the context of 
incentive-based compensation: executives demand higher compensation for un-
certainty that compensation may never be realized.242 It logically follows that ex-
ecutives are incentivized to demand a risk premium for the risk of clawbacks. 
Moreover, it follows that all targeted companies pay this risk premium, even if 
the Comprehensive Clawback Coverage is too weak to justify the premium.  
In theory, clawbacks incentivize executives to negotiate for higher compen-
sation, particularly in the form of base salary, because base salary is not subject 
to clawbacks. Moreover, Managerial Power Theory suggests that executives are 
able to fulfill this incentive by influencing their compensation structures.243 
Several authorities suggest that the base salary has increased or will increase 
as a risk premium for clawbacks. The SEC expressed concerns that in response to 
Dodd-Frank clawbacks, “executive officers may demand that incentive-based 
compensation comprise a smaller portion of their pay packages, or that they re-
ceive a greater total amount of compensation, to account for the possibility that 
the awarded incentive-based compensation may be reduced due to future recov-
ery.”244 The SEC also predicted that Dodd-Frank § 954 clawbacks impact not only 
“the magnitude of the expected compensation, but also to how an executive views 
and responds to the compensation.”245 For example, because of the increased un-
certainty created by § 954’s no-fault mandatory clawback,  
 
risk averse executives may lower the value that they attach to 
the incentive-based component of their pay and . . . demand an 
offset to bear the increased uncertainty . . . [either] in the form 
of a smaller portion of pay being comprised of incentive-based 
compensation . . . [or] an increase in expected total compensa-
tion, which would come at a greater cost to the issuer.246  
 
In addition, Steven Bank and George Georgiev point out that “[o]ne easy way 
to game the [clawback] rules would be to receive less in incentive compensation 
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and more in fixed salary.”247 Others have argued that § 954’s disjointed three-part 
enforcement creates additional uncertainty for executives,248 leading to further 
base pay increases.249 
In addition, financial institutions targeted by TARP and Dodd-Frank appear 
to be increasing base salaries in response to clawback legislation. One American 
Bar Association publication explains that, “[i]n keeping with the government’s 
[legislation], numerous companies (especially financial institutions) are changing 
their compensation structures . . . A number of financial institutions recently in-
creased employees’ base compensation . . . .”250 Suggesting that base salary in-
creases may be a response to clawbacks, another study found that,  
 
the Troubled Asset Relief Program . . . has affected not only the 
level of pay but [also] the structure of pay in a sense. . . . Budg-
ets [for base salary] are inching up as companies begin to feel 
more comfortable with business performance and to address a 
pent up demand for base salary increases.251 
 
Moreover, the Sarbanes-Oxley prohibition on clawback indemnification252 
likely increases base salaries for CEOs and CFOs in the form of disguised ex ante 
indemnification. Because traditional ex post indemnification is prohibited under 
§ 304,253 CEOs and CFOs are incentivized to negotiate up front for higher base 
salary to cover the risk of future clawbacks. Although the value of this risk pre-
mium cannot be quantified, it logically follows that the value would be the esti-
mated value of future clawback liability that cannot be indemnified. Furthermore, 
companies are likely paying this risk premium even though § 304 clawbacks are 
statistically unlikely. Section 304 has only been enforced against twenty-five 
CEOs or CFOs,254 so most never actually “use” their disguised indemnification 
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risk premium even though nearly 4,000 SEC-regulated companies255 incur the as-
sociated agency cost. 
1.  Empirical Study 
To analyze the influence of the clawback provisions on compensation trends, 
this section presents an original empirical study of S&P 1500 CEO compensation 
over the past ten years.256 This study serves two main benefits: (1) it consolidates 
the year-to-year growth changes in components of executive compensation over 
time and (2) it reveals trends in the portion of base salary that constitutes total 
compensation. More specifically, this study seeks to answer whether executives 
have begun negotiating for higher base salary in response to the clawbacks that 
target incentive-based compensation. 
Methodology. This study compiles data from the ExecuComp Database,257 
using the S&P 1500 sample,258 which is most useful for analyzing the effects of 
Sarbanes-Oxley § 304 and Dodd-Frank § 954, which target publicly listed com-
panies. This study analyzes three metrics: base pay, total compensation as re-
ported in the SEC filings, and total grant-date compensation.259 While the SEC 
filings do not report total compensation prior to 2006, the ExecuComp Database 
includes data on base salary and grant-date compensation dating back to 2000, 
which has been included to examine trends related to Sarbanes-Oxley (2002).260 
This study presents both averages and medians, which may be “more relevant 
[than averages] in describing compensation for a ‘typical’ CEO” by removing 
highly-paid outliers.261 
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Findings. This study supports—or at least does not disprove—concerns that 
clawbacks incentivize increased executive compensation. This study finds a cor-
relation, though not causation, between the implementation of clawback statutes 
and CEOs negotiating for larger base salaries. Sarbanes-Oxley was implemented 
in 2002; TARP in 2008; Dodd-Frank in 2010; and the Dodd-Frank § 956 Proposed 
Rules in 2016.262 Over that time frame, 1) base salaries have steadily increased, 
and 2) total compensation has increased at a slower rate than the rate at which 
base salary has increased.263 
Figure 1 below shows that base salary is increasing at an average of $12,444 
and median of $11,619 per year. Another study also found that base salary has 
been steadily increasing, and company salary budgets have increased at a median 
of 3% per year from 2012–2016.264 
 
Figure 1 
 
While the increase in total compensation and the increase in base salary are 
both slowing down, Figures 2 and 3 show that base salary is slowing down at a 
lower rate, which suggests that base salary is increasing relative to total compen-
sation and total grant-date compensation.265 More specifically, the year-to-year 
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increase in base pay is slowing down at an average of -1.45% per year and a me-
dian of -0.31% per year.266 The year-to-year increase in total compensation, as 
reported on SEC filings, is slowing down at an average of -3.25% per year and 
median of -0.51% per year.267 The year-to-year increase in total grant-date com-
pensation is slowing down at an average of -3.60% per year and median of -0.06% 
per year.268  
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Figure 2 
 
 
Figure 3 
 
On the other hand, Figure 4 below shows that the portion of base pay that 
constitutes total compensation is decreasing at an average rate of -1.1% per year 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Pe
rc
en
t	
C
ha
ng
e	
Ye
ar
	-
Ye
ar
Year
S&P	1500	CEO	Compensation	(Year-Year	Changes)
Average	Percent	
Change	in	Total	
Compensation
Median	Percent	
Change	in	Total	
Compensation
Average	Percent	
Change	in	Total	
Compensation	(as	
reported	in	SEC	filings)
Median	Percent	
Change	in	Total	
Compensation	(as	
reported	in	SEC	filings)
Average	Percent	
Change	in	Base	Salary
Median	Percent	
Change	in	Base	Salary
y	=	-3.5965x	+	7268
y	=	-0.0573x	+	121.36
y	=	-3.2497x	+	6575.7
y	=	-0.5076x	+	1028.1
y	=	-1.4519x	+	2941.6
y	=	-0.3054x	+	618.03
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Pe
rc
en
t	
C
ha
n
ge
	Y
ea
r	
-Y
ea
r
Year
S&P	1500	CEO	Compensation	Trends	(Year-Year	Changes)
Trend:	Average	Percent	
Change	in	Grant-Date	
Compensation
Trend:	Median	Percent	
Change	in	Grant-Date	
Compensation
Trend:	Average	Percent	
Change	in	Total	
Compensation	(SEC	
Filing)
Trend:	Median	Percent	
Change	in	Total	
Compensation	(SEC	
Filing)
Trend:	Average	Percent	
Change	in	Base	Salary
Trend:	Median	Percent	
Change	in	Base	Salary
390  BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP & THE LAW Vol. XI:II 
 
and median rate of -1.01% per year.269 Although S&P 1500 CEOs are undoubt-
edly negotiating for more base pay, they seem to bargain for slightly more com-
pensation in other forms as well—likely bonuses.270 An S&P 500 study by Equilar 
however, found that, “base salary and awarded stock grants both increased in me-
dian value in each of the past five years [from 2011–2016], while stock option 
grants decreased in value at the median over that time period”271 The S&P 500 
dataset suggests that executives at larger companies are in fact bargaining for 
more base salary than equity compensation.272  
 
 
Figure 4 
 
In conclusion, Figures 1–4 illustrate the correlation between the implementa-
tion of the clawback provisions, beginning with Sarbanes-Oxley in 2002, and an 
increase in executive compensation over the same time period.273 While this study 
establishes a correlation between increased compensation and clawback provi-
sions, several factors prevent the assertion of a causal link.274 Most notably, ex-
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ecutive compensation was increasing before the implementation of the claw-
backs,275 but comparable data is not available to expand the time frame of this 
study. In addition, increased base pay may be caused by various other factors, 
such as concerns that incentive stock compensation is not well correlated with 
performance, from which the influence of the clawback provisions cannot be 
clearly distinguished.276 Still, this study demonstrates that compensation trends 
are consistent with, and do not disprove, theories about executives’ logical incen-
tive to increase compensation and base salary in response to the clawback provi-
sions.277  
If base salary is in fact increasing in response to clawbacks, it is an unfavor-
able public policy. In addition to the cost of salaries, Managerial Power Theory 
suggests that increased compensation often leads to further increases in compen-
sation, resembling a chain-reaction where executives’ cognitive dissonance leads 
them to expect and often receive continual salary increases.278 In 2015, the SEC 
also expressed concerns that increased base pay in response to clawbacks could 
“reduce pay-for-performance sensitivity and may reduce the correlation between 
the executive officer’s effort to enhance value [they provide to the company].”279 
Investors may also suffer, because shifting from incentive-based compensation to 
base salary allows directors to privately determine base compensation instead of 
providing clear, publicly-disclosed performance metrics for stock-compensation. 
C.  Clawbacks Incentivize Costly Circumvention of Clawback Provisions 
Because most clawbacks are triggered by some form of disclosure inaccu-
racy, executives may be incentivized to 1) forego valuable projects involving 
difficult accounting judgments that might result in accounting misstatements; 2) 
overinvest in financial reporting to protect themselves at a high cost to share-
holders; and 3) attempt to reduce the effect of a clawback, resulting in a different 
penalty than shareholders initially believed they approved.280 Steven Bank and 
George Georgiev have also expressed concerns that in response to clawbacks, 
“executive . . . attention . . . will be wasted on developing strategies to make 
executive compensation clawback-proof and on technical compliance with the 
complex rules.”281 Clawbacks create incentives for unproductive and costly be-
havior. 
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D.  Clawbacks Drive Talented Employees Away from Companies Targeted 
by Clawback Provisions. 
The Dodd-Frank § 956 Proposed Rules may drive talented employees to seek 
jobs where regulations do not apply. For example, over-inclusive clawback pro-
visions may incentivize highly-compensated employees to leave Covered Institu-
tions for smaller banks, hedge funds, or non-U.S. companies.282 As a result, sys-
temic financial risks are not eliminated, but merely shuffled amongst new 
companies. In reference to Dodd-Frank clawbacks, the 2016 Republican CHOICE 
Act 1.0 explains that, “[f]ar from mitigating systemic risk, driving talented pro-
fessionals out of the financial services sector only increases the likelihood of a 
future financial crisis.”283 More drastically, over-inclusive clawbacks may drive 
business out of the United States,284 creating agency costs due to sub-optimal, 
long-distance business management and international transaction costs. For ex-
ample, foreign companies might delist from U.S. stock exchanges in response to 
Dodd-Frank clawbacks that target listed companies, because even though “U.S. 
listing confers advantages on non-U.S. companies . . . the burden from the [claw-
back] rules may well outweigh these advantages.”285 Not only are corporate relo-
cation costs increased, but driving companies out of the country is contrary to 
Dodd-Frank’s purpose of ensuring financial stability in the United States. 
VI.  SOLUTION 
While this comment primarily sets out to clarify executive compensation 
clawbacks and highlight the major flaw that clawbacks increase agency costs, one 
solution follows logically: repealing or amending statutory clawback legislation 
may lower the agency costs associated with clawbacks. It is unlikely that claw-
backs will be entirely repealed, but amendments appear likely in the near future. 
For example, the 2017 Republican-controlled House released a draft of the 
CHOICE Act 2.0 in April 2017, outlining an amendment to Dodd-Frank § 954, 
but not a total repeal. Amendment or repeal might prove to be difficult in the near 
future, given President Trump’s recent executive order that, “for every one new 
regulation issued, at least two prior regulations be identified for elimination.”286 
Congressional action and legislative repeal may not be required to reduce claw-
back agency costs though; the Appropriate Federal Regulators287 can proscribe 
new rules under Dodd-Frank § 956 to minimize executives’ risk of clawbacks and 
thus decrease the associated risk premium. This route appears most likely, given 
                                                     
282 Coffee, supra note 155, at 1071–72. 
283 Financial Choice Act 1.0, supra note 111, at 110. 
284 See Coffee, supra note 160, at 1071–72. 
285 Bank & Georgiev, supra note 247. 
286 Presidential Executive Order on Reducing Regulation and Controlling Regulatory Costs, The 
White House: Office of the Press Secretary (Jan. 30, 2017). 
287 See Dodd-Frank, supra note 58. 
2018                         CLAWBACKS AND THEIR COSTLY FLAW                                          393 
 
that Trump’s Executive Order does not apply to independent federal regulators 
like the SEC.288 
Others argue that clawback provisions should be maintained or strength-
ened.289 Repealing clawback provisions may deprive shareholders of a tool for 
holding executives accountable. When Dodd-Frank was first enacted, one com-
mentator speculated that “clawbacks . . . may arm shareholder plaintiffs and share-
holder activists with a major new weapon.”290 In addition, maintaining clawbacks 
might ensure accounting compliance. One study found that, “big, ugly [material] 
earnings restatements aren’t as common as they used to be . . . the number of 
companies restating results peaked in 2006, at 1,550. By [2012] that figure had 
fallen to 713.”291 Fewer accounting restatements may suggest that clawback pro-
visions encourage accounting compliance.  
On the other hand, the rejection of shareholder demands in the Walmart for-
eign bribery scandal292 demonstrates that companies are able to dominate share-
holders, and rare clawback enforcement could simply be the result of the weak 
Comprehensive Clawback Coverage.293 Furthermore, reducing statutory claw-
back provisions would not eliminate clawbacks all together. Most companies 
would likely retain contractual policies, because shareholders want and expect 
them now that contractual clawback policies have become commonplace.294 On 
balance, some form of legislative repeal, legislative amendment, or regulatory 
policy shift is necessary to reduce the burdensome agency costs associated with 
clawback provisions.  
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Under U.S. law, there are five compensation clawback mechanisms. Three 
are statutory: Sarbanes-Oxley § 304, Dodd-Frank § 954, and 12 U.S.C. § 5221 
(TARP). One is a proposed regulation pursuant to Dodd-Frank § 956. In addition, 
companies often maintain contractual clawback policies with coverage extending 
beyond statutory requirements. This paper analyzed the targets, triggers, penal-
ties, enforcement bodies, and purposes of each clawback mechanism, then con-
densed that analysis to create the “Comprehensive Clawback Coverage.” The 
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Comprehensive Clawback Coverage provides a clear synopsis of the current legal 
framework for executive compensation clawbacks.  
Analysis of the Comprehensive Clawback Coverage reveals a major flaw in 
the current legal framework: clawbacks increase agency costs. First, clawbacks 
fail to prevent costly executive wrongdoing, because the Comprehensive Claw-
back Coverage is weak, and discretionary clawbacks are enforced in relation to a 
company’s financial success rather than the underlying wrongdoing, as illustrated 
by case studies of the Wells Fargo Fraudulent Account Scandal and the Walmart 
Foreign Bribery Scandal. Second, logical inferences from an original empirical 
study and supporting authorities suggest that the clawbacks may be increasing 
executive compensation, particularly base salary, in the form of a “risk premium.” 
Third, clawback provisions incentivize costly circumvention of clawback rules. 
Fourth, the clawbacks drive talented employees away from companies subject to 
clawbacks. The logical solution to reduce these agency costs involves a legislative 
repeal, legislative amendment, or regulatory policy shift with respect to executive 
compensation clawback provisions.  
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VIII. APPENDIX 
The following tables were used to calculate the empirical study of executive com-
pensation trends in Section V.B.1 of this article (Figures 1–4). Further supporting 
data and calculations can also be provided upon request.  
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